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ABSTRACT 
Is collective intelligence just individual intelligence 
writ large, or are there fundamental differences?  This 
position paper argues that a cognitive history 
methodology can shed light into the nature of 
collective intelligence and its differences from 
individual intelligence.  To advance this proposed 
area of research, a small case study on the structure 
of argument and proof is presented.  Quantitative 
metrics from network science are used to compare 
the artifacts of deduction from two sources.  The first 
is the work of Archimedes of Syracuse, putatively an 
individual, and of other ancient Greek 
mathematicians.  The second is work of the Polymath 
Project, a massively collaborative mathematics 
project that used blog posts and comments to prove 
new results in combinatorics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Greek geometers of antiquity such as Euclid of 
Alexandria, Archimedes of Syracuse, and Apollonius 
of Pergaeus lived in a world very different from 
today.  There was perhaps only one mathematician 
born per year, spread rather thinly across the eastern 
Mediterranean.  Ancient Greek mathematicians were 
isolated both in space and in time (Netz, 1999, p. 
291).  Moreover, their repertoire of technological 
tools did not include pen/paper, chalk/blackboard, or 
modern information technologies, but was limited to 
wetted sand and stick (Netz, 1999, p. 14).  
Nevertheless, the mathematical results that they 
produced are well-recognized as the products of 
intelligence and are often said to have laid down the 
deductive tradition of modern mathematics. 
 
In the modern world occupied by Fields Medalists 
such as Terence Tao and W. Timothy Gowers, 
mathematics has become central, with thousands of 
mathematicians around the globe connected by 
information technologies that allow communication 
faster than the blink of an eye.  Large, loosely 
organized groups of people, whether mathematicians 
or otherwise, can now work together electronically in 
effective ways.  Groups of individuals collectively 
doing things that seem intelligent has been termed 
collective intelligence (Malone et al., 2010).  
Mathematical proof, a kind of problem-solving 
(Hong and Page, 2001), is one exemplar of intelligent 
things.  
 
Previous studies of collective intelligence (Malone et 
al., 2010) have developed a taxonomy organized 
around building blocks of: 
 What is being done?, 
 Who is doing it?, 
 Why are they doing it?, and 
 How is it being done? 
Although such a taxonomy broadly defines how 
collective intelligence is performed, there is insight to 
be derived from a detailed focus on the ‘doing of 
intelligence’ in this new form. 
 
Woolley et al. (2010) have studied collective 
intelligence from a cognitive science perspective.  
They define a group’s collective intelligence to be the 
general ability of a group to perform a wide variety 
of tasks, and think of it as a single scalar quantity.  
They find that collective intelligence is not just the 
average of individual intelligences, but there are 
other factors at play: it is a property of the group 
itself, not just the individuals comprising it.   
 
In particular, they find that collective intelligence is 
correlated with network properties such as the 
average social sensitivity of group members, the 
equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, 
and the proportion of females in the group.   
 
Rather than determining that collective intelligence 
can be measured and which features other than 
constituent individual intelligences are correlated to 
it, our goal here is to see if there are differences in the 
process of cognition: is collective intelligence 
different in kind from individual intelligence? 
Many have argued for a modular theory of mind 
(Fodor, 1983), with a brain composed of many agents 
(Livnat and Pippenger, 2006).  Indeed, if the 
individual mind is modular, then the processes of 
cognition in individual intelligence may not be too 
different from those in collective intelligence. 
 
As it turns out, individual intelligence has been 
correlated with network properties of the brain, just 
as collective intelligence has been correlated with 
network properties of the group.  Efficient 
information flow correlates positively with 
intelligence, since high intelligence probably requires 
smooth information transfer among brain regions.  
Moreover, intelligent brains process information 
more efficiently by using fewer brain resources when 
performing cognitive tasks (Deary et al., 2010).  
 
To study whether collective intelligence is different 
from individual intelligence, we take the position that 
artifacts from the process of cognition should be 
examined and compared quantitatively.  Historical 
artifacts are a product of a given place and time, and 
may be thought of as limited, but they provide a kind 
of detailed description and insight that even 
controlled experiments in cognitive science cannot.   
 
As such, methods from cognitive history, i.e. 
introduced by Netz (1999), should be adopted.  
Moreover, since two different kinds of artifacts are to 
be compared, the result will be a comparative study 
that in some sense follows Mill’s canonical inductive 
inference methods based on agreement and difference 
(Mill, 1872).  We term our approach comparative 
cognitive history. 
 
The artifacts of mathematical deduction and proof 
serve as a good starting point for this research agenda 
since they are discrete objects whose structures are 
easily captured and quantified.
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We consider the two following examples of artifacts 
of deduction for our case study.  For individual 
intelligence, we consider the geometry theorems of 
ancient Greek mathematicians such as those in 
Euclid’s Elements, Archimedes’ The Method, and 
Apollonius’ Conics.  We examine the structure of 
argument that they use in their proofs (Netz, 1999), 
treating this structure as a directed graph.  For 
collective intelligence, we consider the combinatorial 
proof of the Density Hales-Jewett theorem that was 
developed by the Polymath Project (Cranshaw and 
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 Note that although there are many social and 
epistemic considerations surrounding the nature of 
deduction, see e.g. (MacKenzie, 2001), we do not 
deal with them here. 
Kittur, 2011).  Rather than looking at the proof itself, 
we look at the structure of arguments that were put 
forth in developing the proof.  Again, this structure 
can be treated as a directed graph. 
 
To compare directed graphs, we adopt measures from 
network science (Jackson, 2010; Easley and 
Kleinberg, 2010) including degree distributions and 
subgraph distributions.  Subgraph distributions have 
been used to define structural motifs (Milo et al., 
2002) and families of networks (Milo et al., 2004). 
 
We see that the structure of the Polymath Project 
work involves much broader degree distributions 
than the work of say Archimedes.  That is, in the 
Polymath Project there are instances where a large 
number of statements are used to build an argument 
and instances where a single statement is used to 
support many arguments.  We also see that the 
‘Aristotelian syllogism’ subgraph appears more 
frequently in Archimedes than in Polymath, 
suggesting that this was a commonly used argument 
structure in Greek antiquity.  Moreover, simple 
implications are the predominant form of argument in 
Polymath, suggesting a need to keep things simple. 
 
The remainder of this position paper is organized as 
follows.  First, we provide background on methods of 
cognitive history and quantitative epistemology and 
argue for the use of a quantitative comparative 
cognitive history to study individual and collective 
intelligence.  Next we initiate a case study to 
demonstrate the validity of the proposed research 
agenda, by detailing the background of two artifacts.  
Quantitative characterization and comparison is 
presented next.  Finally, limitations of the current 
case study and next steps for the broader program of 
studying the ‘doing of intelligence’ are given. 
COGNITIVE HISTORY 
The methodology of cognitive history was introduced 
by Netz (1999) to study the nature of deduction.  As 
others have noted, however, the basic methodology is 
common to other parts of science studies with its 
“obsessive attention to the material, historical, and 
practical conditions necessary for the discovery of 
new cognitive skills” (Latour, 2008). 
 
As its name implies, cognitive history lies at the 
intersection of cognitive science and history.  Like 
cognitive science, it approaches knowledge through 
its structural forms and practices rather than its 
specific propositional content.  Like the history of 
science, it studies specific cultural artifacts rather 
than through experiments whose results are meant to 
be universally applicable.   
 
By focusing on specific historical artifacts rather than 
potentially generalizable phenomena as in cognitive 
science, one might wonder what is lost.  Looking at it 
another way, even though there are generalizable 
measures of intelligence (Deary et al., 2010; Wooley 
et al., 2010), it is not clear that there are universal 
rules that govern the process of reasoning.   
 
While there may be no general, universal rules for 
reasoning, such rules do exist historically in specific 
contexts (Netz, 1999, p. 6).  Reasoning is done in a 
very specific way and there is a method to the 
deployment of cognitive resources.  Specific 
cognitive methods are specific ways of ‘doing the 
cognitive thing.’  They change over historical 
timescales and so may seem relatively stable for long 
periods, but are not constant (Netz, 1999).  
Technological change, including the introduction of 
new information technologies, changes cognitive 
processes (Sparrow et al., 2011). 
 
Hence cognitive methods should be studied as 
historical phenomena, valid for their period and 
place, rather than universally so.  Our comparative 
cognitive history approach takes this position. 
 
Netz (1999) used some basic quantitative methods in 
his study of deduction in Greek mathematics, but our 
position is that this can be taken further by adopting 
methods from network science and discrete 
mathematics.  In this sense, we follow ideas from 
quantitative epistemology. 
 
Quantitative epistemology studies the nature of 
knowledge with numerical techniques.  It is said that 
“such techniques enable one to supplement intuitive 
or impressionistic analyses by re-framing qualitative 
problems in quantitative terms” (Barany, 2009).  
Quantitative epistemological analysis proceeds in 
three steps (Barany, 2009): 
1. Capture knowledge in a form that can be 
analyzed quantitatively, 
2. Develop means of quantification to match 
epistemic intuitions, and 
3. Use mathematical techniques to study these 
quantifications 
so as to aid in understanding the systems of 
knowledge under consideration.  We use this basic 
checklist in our case study to demonstrate its validity 
for comparing the structure of knowledge arising 
from examples of individual and of collective 
intelligence. 
 
BACKGROUND ON ARTIFACTS 
D. H. J. Polymath  
The aim of the Polymath Project was twofold: first to 
find an elementary proof of a special case of the 
Density Hales-Jewett (DHJ) theorem, which is a 
result in combinatorics that can be interpreted in 
terms of playing multidimensional tic-tac-toe; and 
second to demonstrate the utility of collective 
intelligence for mathematical research (Gowers and 
Nielsen, 2009). 
 
Participation was open to anyone in the world, and 
the primary approach taken was the development of 
small statements and arguments towards a proof of 
the theorem.  The main venue for participants to 
work was within the posts and comments of the 
personal blogs of noted mathematicians Timothy 
Gowers and Terence Tao.  Rules explicitly 
discouraged participants from working extensively on 
their own without discussing progress on the blog 
(Cranshaw and Kittur, 2011). 
 
In initiating the Polymath Project, “Gowers sought 
the kind of free-wheeling conversational interplay 
one finds in interpersonal mathematical collaboration 
at its best” (Barany, 2010).  Blogs are an appropriate 
technology since they have a temporal ordering and 
organization, just like conversations (Barany, 2010).   
 
Although a small fraction of contributors created 
most of the content—notably Gowers and Tao—
almost all contributors provided some content that 
was influential to the task of deduction (Cranshaw 
and Kittur, 2011).  
 
The end result was indeed a combinatorial proof of 
the DHJ theorem, which has been submitted for 
publication under the nom de plume D. H. J. 
Polymath (Gowers, 2010).  More importantly for our 
purposes, however, the numbered blog comments and 
their reference structure left a historical record of the 
process of deduction by a collective intelligence.  We 
use the structure of these comments as reconstructed 
by Cranshaw and Kittur (2011).   
 
Tao suggested that in its broader principles there was 
little to differentiate Polymath from ordinary 
mathematical research (Barany, 2010), however it is 
our position that this is an open question to be 
studied. 
Archimedes (and Euclid and Apollonius) 
In looking at artifacts of deduction that arise from 
individual intelligence, we consider a few proofs of 
theorems from Greek antiquity.  In particular:    
 Euclid’s Elements II.5 
 Archimedes’ The Method I 
 Archimedes’ On Sphere and Cylinder 1.30 
 Archimedes’ Spiral Lines 9 
 Apollonius’ Conics 1.41 
 
These works are considered classics in the history of 
rigorous deduction, focusing on problems in 
geometry. 
 
Greek mathematics was often reported in exchanges 
with other potentially interested parties.  These 
mathematical exchanges were accompanied by 
lettered diagrams that defined the closed deductive 
system.  An exclusively oral presentation was 
therefore ruled out, leaving the fully written form for 
addressing mathematicians abroad and a semi-oral 
form, with some diagram, for presentation to a small 
group of fellow local mathematicians (Netz, 1999, p. 
14).  Greek mathematics was like a conversation. 
 
In coming forward to the modern era, theorems and 
proofs have been carried through various 
intermediary people and technologies (Netz and 
Noel, 2007), however they retain the characteristics 
of individual intelligence.  We use the structure of 
these proofs as reconstructed by Netz (1999).  This 
consists of an ordered sequence of statements and 
references to previous statements that are used to 
make arguments in support; there are also starting-
point statements that require no justification. 
 
It is said that “Greek mathematical proofs are the 
result of genuine cross-fertilization,” (Netz, 1999, p. 
170) involving the use of many different sources of 
starting-points.  Indeed, “derivatives of a single 
assertion must carry similar informative contents, 
whose intersection could be neither surprising nor 
revealing,” (Netz, 1999, p. 170) and a desire of many 
Greek mathematicians was to be playful and 
surprising (Netz, 2009). 
STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT AND PROOF 
Having described the artifacts under study, we now 
proceed to demonstrate our quantitative cognitive 
history program.  The first step is a quantitative 
representation of the artifacts. 
 
In discussing the deductive process in the Polymath 
Project, we use the notion of an argument graph.  
Such a graph has nodes that correspond to numbered 
statements and directed edges that correspond to 
references among statements.  The statements are 
comments on blog posts.  Due to the time-ordering of 
comments, the graph is a directed acyclic graph.  
Although it has many connected components—often 
comments that did not lead anywhere—we look at 
the largest component with 299 comments that is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
In discussing the logical process represented in the 
proofs of Archimedes and others, we also use 
argument graphs.  Nodes are statements and directed 
edges are from a statement that is supported by 
another statement through citation.  Due to the logical 
flow of proofs, the graphs are acyclic.  All graphs are 
a single component.  Figures 2–6 show these graphs. 
 
Figure 1: Polymath Project argument graph. 
 
Figure 2: Elements II.5 argument graph. 
 
Figure 3: The Method I argument graph. 
 
 
Figure 4: On Sphere and Cylinder 1.30 argument 
graph. 
 
Figure 5: Spiral Lines 9 argument graph. 
 
Figure 6: Conics 1.41 argument graph. 
QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON 
Having captured a representation of the artifacts as 
directed acyclic graphs, some things are self-evident, 
such as the differences in number of nodes.  Indeed 
logical size as measured by number of assertions and 
arguments and related measures of logical 
complexity (Barany, 2009) represent cognitive reality 
(Netz, 1999, p. 200). 
 
Here we focus on microstructure at the level of 
individual statements and arguments to see whether 
there are comparative patterns that match intuitions 
about cognitive process and epistemology.   
 
One intuition we might have is that as compared to 
an individual intelligence, a collective intelligence 
might be able to incorporate many more ideas to 
argue for a new idea and that a single idea can be 
used to support a greater multitude of subsequent 
ideas in members of a collective.  To test this 
mathematically, we look at the degree distributions of 
the arguments graphs.  Nodes that are strong hubs 
(with high in-degree) would correspond to intense 
integration of information whereas nodes that are 
strong authorities (with high out-degree) would 
correspond to intense dissemination of information 
(Kleinberg, 1999).  Figures 7 and 8 show the in-
degree and out-degree distributions of the several 
argument graphs.  As can be observed, the Polymath 
Project has a much broader degree distribution with 
stronger hubs and authorities.  This suggests that the 
intuition was correct for these particular historical 
artifacts. 
 
 
Figure 7: In-degree survival functions for argument 
graphs. 
 
Figure 8: Out-degree survival functions for argument 
graphs. 
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Figure 9: Subgraphs. 
 
 
Figure 10: Subgraph distributions for argument 
graphs. 
 
Next we consider subgraphs on three nodes, 
restricting ourselves to ones where there is at least 
one directed edge (so as to reduce the influence of the 
graph density in the analysis).  Since argument 
graphs are acyclic, there are only five such subgraphs 
rather than fifteen.  We use the names given in Figure 
9 to denote them.   
 
Figure 10 shows the subgraph distributions of the 
various argument graphs.  In Polymath, the 
implication occurs with greater frequency than the 
other kinds of subgraphs, as compared to the Greek 
mathematicians.  The fan, chain, and syllogism are 
particularly more frequent in Greek work.   
 
When describing Greek work, Netz (1999, p. 199) 
had noted, “larger arguments exist, but are a rarity.  
We see therefore that arguments are short – and this 
is one way in which they are easy to follow.”  It 
seems from the subgraph analysis, however, that 
structurally speaking Polymath uses short and easy-
to-follow arguments to an even greater extent than 
Greek mathematics from antiquity. 
 
As noted previously, one common way to analyze 
subgraph distributions in network science is through 
the concept of structural motifs.  Motifs are 
subgraphs overrepresented as compared to a null 
random graph ensemble (Milo et al., 2002).  
Subgraph distributions have also been used to define 
families of networks, such as the family of rate-
limited information-processing networks (Milo et al., 
2004).  We leave investigation of motifs to future 
work due to the difficulty in defining an appropriate 
random graph ensemble of directed acyclic graphs.  
Similarly, the paucity of directed acyclic graphs in 
nature prevents a family characterization at this time.  
 
To summarize, numerical analysis of degree and 
subgraph distributions has led to some insight into 
the cognitive process of D. H. J. Polymath and of 
several Greek mathematicians.  As argued before, 
this cannot give universal insights into the difference 
between collective intelligence and individual 
intelligence.  But as per our comparative cognitive 
history agenda, it does do so for two particular 
historical artifacts. 
GOING FORWARD 
We have used two particular historical artifacts to try 
to tease out some potential differences between 
collective intelligence and individual intelligence in 
specific contexts.  A systematic survey of many 
artifacts should provide even greater insight.  
Although not trying to fit universalist assumptions, 
one might nevertheless want to use a larger corpus to 
mitigate some concerns about confounding variables. 
Limitations 
In the current case study, one kind of confounding 
variable is the time and place in history: historical 
artifacts are products of contextual milieus.  Indeed 
the modern global mathematical enterprise is very 
different than the Greek mathematical enterprise of 
antiquity.   
 
Another confound is the difference between final 
proof and the process of proving; between cognition 
in action and cognition in representation.  We studied 
the final proof in the case of the ancient Greeks but 
the process of deduction in the case of Polymath.  As 
noted by Gowers (2010), “although a proof, when 
written out, is a fairly linear object, starting from the 
premises and taking a direct route to the conclusion, 
the discovery of a proof is far from linear.  It is more 
like a tree with many branches; but when you finally 
discover the branch that leads to the subbranch that 
leads to the twig that has at the end of it the solitary 
fruit that is the conclusion you were looking for, you 
throw away the rest of the tree.” 
 
A third is the branch of mathematics: one artifact was 
concerned with combinatorics whereas the other set 
of artifacts with geometry.  Could the culture and 
cognitive process of deduction be different in these 
two subfields? 
Next Steps 
More detailed mathematical analyses of artifacts 
beyond the basic results in the case study above may 
lead to enhanced understanding.  Here, however, we 
highlight some ideas for limiting some confounding 
variables by the use of a larger corpus.  With a large 
corpus of artifacts and their mathematically-defined 
features, data mining methods might even be able to 
discern common patterns across multifarious 
intelligences. 
 
A first artifact to add is the structure of proof in the 
work of D. H. J. Polymath (Gowers, 2010) to 
supplement the artifact from the process of proving 
studied herein. 
 
A second artifact to add is from the work by a 
modern mathematician.  As an example, consider 
Terence Tao’s recent work on localization and 
compactness properties of the Navier-Stokes global 
regularity problem.  This result solves one of the 
Clay Mathematics Institute Millennium Prize 
Problems and is eligible for the $1 million prize.  The 
implication diagram that explains the structure of 
argument is shown in Figure 11, (Tao, 2011). 
 
A third artifact to add is the structure of proof in 
Archimedes’ Stomachion, one of the earliest works in 
combinatorics rather than geometry in Greek 
antiquity (Netz and Noel, 2007). 
 
Figure 11: Implication diagram for Terence Tao’s 
work on the Navier-Stokes problem. 
CONCLUSION 
In this position paper, we put forth a research agenda 
to understand the ‘doing of cognition’ in collective 
intelligence through comparison with individual 
intelligence.  To do so, we proposed the use of 
methods from cognitive history, with the attendant 
focus on understanding knowledge through its 
structure rather than its content by examination of 
specific cultural artifacts.  We also demonstrated this 
with a small case study in the area of deductive 
reasoning. 
 
A deeper analysis of mathematical deduction would 
be one way to step forward, however there are a 
whole host of other artifacts of collective intelligence 
that could be studied, cf. (Malone et al., 2010).  As an 
example, a prominent use of collective intelligence is 
for calculation rather than proof; indeed calculation 
has just as deep a history as proof, with a multitude 
of cultural artifacts of individual intelligence 
(Narasimha, 2003). 
 
Ultimately, comparative cognitive history may help 
shed light on the possibilities and constraints of new 
and emerging kinds of collective intelligence. 
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